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STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER
AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Plaintiff-Appellant Karen Hepp (“Hepp”), commenced this action
against Defendants-Appellees Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), Imgur, Inc.
(“Imgur”), Reddit, Inc. (“Reddit”), Giphy, Inc. (“Giphy”) and WGCZ,
S.R.O. (“WGCZ”) via Complaint on September 4, 2019 and subsequent
Amended Complaint on February 18, 2020 1. Hepp, a local television anchor
for a FOX-affiliated broadcast company, alleges that Defendants-Appellees
featured an unauthorized and clearly unflattering photograph of her on their
respective websites in violation of her statutory and common law right of
publicity.
Hepp’s action was commenced in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. §1332, based upon
diversity of citizenship since Hepp is a Pennsylvania resident; Facebook,
Imgur and Reddit are Delaware corporations, and WGCZ is a foreign
company. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.
This appeal is from the Memorandum Opinions and Orders of the
Honorable John Milton Younge, U.S.D.J., upon which judgment was entered

1

Defendant Giphy was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by Hepp on May 13,
2020. (46a)
1
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dismissing all of Hepp’s claims against Facebook, Imgur and Reddit on June 5,
2020 (3a-17a), on the grounds that the said claims were barred under § 230(c)
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), and upon subsequent judgment
entered on August 3, 2020 (18a-34a), dismissing all of Hepp’s claims against
WGCZ for lack of personal jurisdiction.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291, in that this
appeal is from a final judgment of the District Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
(1) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law in this case of first
impression in this Court, by applying the holding and rationale of Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007), to the instant facts, where,
in that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that immunity under § 230(c) of the CDA
extends to state-based intellectual property claims? (13a-15a; 31a)
(2) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law, with respect to Hepp’s
motion to amend her amended complaint to join NKL Associates, S.R.O.
(“NKL”) as party defendant, by finding that such an action would be futile
because NKL would anyway be immune from state-based intellectual
property claims under Section 230(c) of the CDA? (24a; 31a)
(3) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law, with respect to Hepp’s

2
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motion to amend her amended complaint to add a count for successor
liability as against Defendant WGCZ, by finding that such an action would
be futile because WGCZ would anyway be immune from state-based
intellectual property claims under Section 230(c) of the CDA? (24a; 31a)
(4) Did the Court below err, as a matter of law, in finding that Hepp
was not entitled to jurisdictional discovery as to Defendant WGCZ despite
Hepp’s affirmative proofs of successor liability vis-à-vis WGCZ and NKL
and that XNXX.COM’s activities were purposefully directed toward
Pennsylvania residents? (29a-30a)

STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291. Moreover, the Court
exercises plenary review of the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.
See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010); St. Luke’s Health Network,
Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020).

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS
There are currently no known cases or proceedings pending which are
related to this appeal. The lower Court has acknowledged that this is a case of
first impression in this Court as to the issue of whether Section 230(c) of the

3
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CDA provides immunity from state-based intellectual property claims –
specifically, those sounding in right of publicity. (8a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hepp filed her right of publicity action on September 4, 2019, asserting in her
original Complaint claims against Facebook, Imgur, Reddit, Giphy and WCGZ,
alleging claims for violations of 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I)
and under the Pennsylvania common law right of publicity (Count II). (6a; 39a, D.E.
1). Subsequently, Defendants Imgur, Giphy, Reddit and Facebook filed motions to
dismiss the Complaint, alleging, among other things, Hepp’s failure to state a claim
under the aforementioned theories. (6a; 41a, 43a, D.E. 29, 45-47).
On February 18, 2020, with the motions to dismiss the original Complaint
pending, Hepp filed an Amended Complaint, renewing her original claims with
augmented facts supporting her jurisdictional arguments and further expounding
upon the value of her image with respect to social media metrices. (49a-177a, D.E.
50). Appropriately, the lower Court dismissed the motions to dismiss the original
Complaint as moot. (44a, D.E. 51). In response to the Amended Complaint,
Defendants Imgur, Reddit, Giphy and Facebook renewed their motions to dismiss.
(44a, D.E. 53-56). Thereafter, Hepp timely filed her separate replies to Defendants’
collective motions to dismiss. (45a, D.E. 58-61).
In its Opinion and Order of June 5, 2020, while the District Court

4
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recognizes “a split of authority over the scope of this [Section 230(e)(2) of the
CDA] exclusion,” the Court nevertheless adopts the holding and rationale of
Perfect 10 -- the side of authority that favors a contorted interpretation of the
Section 230(c) of the CDA -- opining that “only federal intellectual property
claims are excluded from the scope of CDA immunity, and for this reason,
Plaintiff’s statutory and common law right of publicity claims are barred by §
230(c) of the CDA.” (12a,15a). The District Court thus granted Defendants
Imgur, Reddit and Facebook’s respective motions to dismiss with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. (16a). For critical reasons grounded in plain-language
interpretation and public policy, discussed infra, the District Court’s decision to
rely upon Perfect 10 for stare decisis in this Court is patently misplaced.
Procedurally, with respect to Defendant WGCZ, WGCZ filed a subsequent
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on May 28, 2020. (46a, D.E. 77). On
June 11, 2020, Hepp, in response, filed a cross-motion to amend her amended
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to add a count for successor liability as to
Defendant WGCZ, and to add NKL as a party defendant. (178a-212a, D.E. 83). In
its Opinion and Order of August 3, 2020, the District Court granted WGCZ’s
motion and denied Hepp’s cross-motion, on the grounds of lack of personal
jurisdiction as to Defendant WGCZ and for failure to state a claim (via adoption
and application of its prior ruling for Defendants Imgur, Reddit and Facebook)

5
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as to proposed defendant NKL. (18a-34a, D.E. 85-86). Assuming, arguendo,
the District Court erroneously relied upon the rationale of Perfect 10 as to
Defendants Imgur, Reddit and Facebook, then by logical conclusion, its application
to WGCZ and/or NKL is likewise flawed. In addition, the District Court’s stated
reasons for disallowing Hepp’s claims for successor liability as to Defendant WGCA
and request for jurisdictional discovery are misplaced, as discussed, infra.
In light of the District Court’s final ruling as to all parties on August 3, 2020,
Hepp filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 21, 2020. (la).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hepp is a television newscaster who has worked for the Philadelphia-based
Fox 29 news team since November 2010. (Am. Compl. (hereafter “AC”) ¶ 37, 54a).
She is a co-anchor of the 4 am to 6 am hours of “Good Day Philadelphia,” a morning
news program, and joins the set as co-host for the final hour of the show from 9 am
to 10 am. (Id. ¶ 38, 54a). Prior to working at Fox 29, Hepp worked for other news
organizations in New York City, Philadelphia and Connecticut. ( Id. ¶¶ 39-41, 55a).
Hepp alleges that “[a]pproximately two years ago, [she] discovered through
her co-workers and managers, that, without her consent, a photograph of her taken
by a security camera in a convenience store in New York City was being used in
online advertisements for erectile dysfunction and dating websites.” ( Id. ¶ 43, 55a).
Hepp further alleges that she “was unaware that her photograph had been taken” in

6
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the store, that she “does not know the identity or the location of the store or how her
photograph was secured,” and that she “has since learned that the photograph has
appeared illegally on many other websites.” ( Id. ¶¶ 44-45, 55a).
With regard to Defendants Facebook, Imgur and Reddit and WGCZ,
respectively, Hepp alleges as follows:
• Her photo was featured in a Facebook advertisement soliciting users
to “meet and chat with single women.” (Id. ¶ 46, Ex. L, 126a-127).
• Her photo was featured on Imgur under the heading “milf,” which
is a derogatory and degrading slang acronym that refers to a sexually
attractive woman with young children. (Id. ¶ 47, Ex. M, 128a-129a).
• Her photo was featured on Reddit site on a page titled “Amazing” in
the subgroup r/obsf (“older but still $#^@able”) and posted by a user
known as “pepsi_next.” (Id. ¶ 48, Ex. N, 130a-139a).
• Her photo was featured on the XNXX.com website in the milf gallery
44/46. (Id. ¶ 50, Ex. P, 142a-143a).

Furthermore, Hepp submits that she has built a considerable following of her
image/brand on social media sites over the past years. (Id. ¶ 51, 56a). For example,
on her Instagram page, Hepp currently has 22,500 followers and regularly posts to
that site. (Id. ¶ 51, Ex. Q, 57a, 144a-148a). Hepp enjoys a considerable Twitter
following (almost 30,000 followers) and in many of her highly watched tweeted
images, she is featured with her co-anchors, Thomas Drayton, Alex Holley, Mike
Jerrick and countless celebrities, including, but not limited to, John Travolta, Vivica
Fox and soccer star Carli Lloyd. (Id. ¶ 53, Ex. R, 57a, 149a-164a).
7
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In terms of measuring the impact of Hepp’s online presence, her daily social
media posting activity reaches thousands of online viewers. (Id. ¶ 54, Ex. S, 57a,
165a-172a). Hepp’s employer, Fox 29 News and its brand, usually controls over
50% of the market share for social media presence in the region, and Hepp typically
scores among the leading personalities who are employed by Fox 29 News. As of
February 11, 2020, Hepp had an SEI (“social equity score”) of 67.7, which is on the
higher scale for the network affiliate. (Id. ¶ 55, Ex. T, 57a, 173a-177a).
Hepp further contends that she is “a well-known public figure who has spent
years honing her skills as a professional television broadcaster,” “is well-regarded
in the Philadelphia community and has earned an excellent reputation as a moral and
upstanding community leader and public person,” and, as a result, “[h]er image, both
on television and on social media, has high intrinsic commercial value.” (Id. ¶¶ 5759, 57a-58a). Hepp’s harm is rooted in Defendants Facebook, Reddit, Imgur and
WGCZ’s usurpation of her image, which has commercial value, and is “instantly
identifiable and automatically associated with Plaintiff’s professional persona.” (Id.
¶¶ 60,62, 58a). The resultant damages stem from Defendants Facebook, Reddit,
Imgur and WGCZ’s sexualization of Hepp’s image and its use for “prurient and
illicit purposes,” an unfortunate consequence that has caused “serious, permanent
and irreparable harm to [her] image and reputation.” (Id. ¶¶ 63-64, 58a). The thrust
of Hepp’s claim sounds in Defendants’ violations of her statutory and common law

8
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right of publicity, which is squarely a creature of intellectual property law.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hepp, a seasoned television broadcaster with Fox-29 News, brought this
diversity action against Defendants Facebook, Imgur, Reddit and WGCZ, alleging
violations of her statutory and common law right of publicity based upon
Defendants’ unsanctioned posting of an unflattering and illicit photograph of her that
appeared on their respective websites. (6a, 39a, 55a).
Despite Hepp’s articulated claims, the District Court dismissed her action for
failure to state a claim, reasoning that under the doctrine promulgated in the Ninth
Circuit’s case of Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir.
2007), § 230(e)(2) of the CDA, which exempts intellectual property claims from the
safe-harbor of § 230(c) of the CDA, does not apply to state-based right of publicity
claims.
The District Court’s holding raises an issue of first impression in this Court.
Effectively, if upheld, the District Court’s decision stands to nullify any and all statebased intellectual property claims brought against Internet-based companies in this
Court. The District Court rests in decision on two major grounds: 1) statutory
uniformity for state-based intellectual property claims and 2) public policy

9
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supporting the free exchange of ideas and enterprise on the Internet. As Hepp will
show, infra, statutory uniformity is neither necessary nor required for the proper
interpretation of various states’ intellectual property laws and the public policy
considerations protecting a once nascent Internet are no longer applicable. To the
contrary, Internet companies, such as Defendants Facebook, Imgur, Reddit and
WGCZ, are now using the shield of § 230(c) of the CDA as a sword against
professionals like Hepp, who are merely attempting to protect their coveted brands
from unauthorized and harmful attacks to their collective public persona on the
Internet.
There are alternative holdings to Perfect 10, such as the one in Atlantic
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
that employs a plain-language interpretation to suggest that Congress’s use of the
modifier “any” in § 230(e)(2) means exempting state-based or federal intellectual
property law from § 230(c) of the CDA. Such an interpretation would be consistent
with maintaining state-based right of publicity claims against Internet-based
companies.
As to Hepp’s arguments relative to the District Court’s dismissal of her claims
against WGCZ, Hepp asserts that the District Court erred in finding that her motions
to amend her amended complaint to add a new party, NKL, and add an addition
count for successor liability against WGCZ were futile. The District Court’s futility

10
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finding was based upon his prior June 5, 2020 ruling as it pertains to § 230(c). Should
this Court decide not to adopt the Perfect 10 holding, then the District Court’s futility
assumption must fail a fortiori. Similarly, Hepp should be entitled to discovery.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE BARRED BY
SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT.
In this important case of first impression in this Court, the District Court
erroneously concluded that § 230 of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), bars all of Hepp’s
statutory and common law right of publicity claims, which are typically considered
state-based intellectual property claims. (14a-15a). While it is true that § 230(c) of
the CDA provides a safe-harbor for Internet service providers (“ISPs”) and website
operators for certain kinds of actions, there is another section of the CDA, §
230(e)(2), wherein Congress expressly provided that “[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” Id.
A. The Perfect 10 Case should not be adopted in this Court as Perfect
10’s logic is faulty and its public policy rationale anachronistic.
At the outset of its decision, the District Court acknowledges the split of
federal common law authority as to whether § 230(e)(2) of the CDA preserves statebased intellectual property claims (e.g., state-based right of publicity claims):
[T]he Court recognizes there that there is a split of authority over
the scope of this exclusion. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). Specifically,
there is disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and some district courts
over whether the CDA preempts state law intellectual property claims.
11
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Compare, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the CDA preempted a state right of
publicity claim); Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes,
Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We have observed before
that because Congress did not define the term ‘intellectual property
law,’ it should be construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s express
policy of providing broad immunity.”); with Doe v. Friendfinder
Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding that
the CDA did not preempt plaintiff’s right of publicity claim); Atlantic
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Section 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity for
either federal or state intellectual property claims.”).
(12a).
The District Court goes on to concede that there is general ambiguity and
inconsistency among other appellate courts, including this Court, which has only
looked at the issue tangentially, as to whether the CDA preempts right of publicity
claims:
Moreover, the Court’s research has yielded no case law from any
other appellate courts that has clearly resolved whether the CDA
preempts right of publicity claims. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 26 n.9 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting the
split of authority over whether the CDA preempts right of publicity
claims but not taking a position where plaintiffs’ claims failed
otherwise on the merits); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316,
1323-24 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing but not deciding the “difficult
issues” of whether the CDA applies to a right of publicity claim, even
though “there appears to be no dispute that the right of publicity is a
type of intellectual property right”). Further, the Court’s research has
revealed no district court opinion within the Third Circuit that has
squarely determined the issue. See, e.g., Parker v. Paypal, No. 16-4786,
2017 WL 3508759, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2017) (holding, without
discussing § 230(e)(2), that plaintiff’s claim for right of publicity under
California law was “clearly preempted and prohibited by § 230”);
Obado, at *7 n.5 (noting the Ninth Circuit’s position but finding that
12
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the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a right of publicity violation and
therefore it was unnecessary to decide whether the claim was excluded
from CDA preemption); but see Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., No.
13-2477, 2013 WL 4426359, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (holding
plaintiff’s claim under Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute
preempted by the CDA).
(Id., 12a-13a, n. 8).
Given then, its judicial discretion to fashion a holding, the District Court,
“persuaded by the reasoning in Perfect 10,” adopts said holding based upon statutory
uniformity and public policy goals:
State laws that could arguably be construed as implicating
“intellectual property” vary and are not uniform in their purposes and
policy goals. Conditioning CDA immunity on the diverse potentially
applicable state laws would have a negative effect on the development
of the internet, and, therefore, would run contrary to the purpose and
intent of the CDA.
…
In this Court’s view, construing § 230(e)(2) as preserving only federal
intellectual property claims is most fitting because this interpretation
simultaneously maintains broad immunity in line with the CDA’s stated
congressional purpose. This preserves the scope of immunity within a
predictable body of federal law as opposed to the diverse state law on
the subject matter. See Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 946 F.3d at
1053 (holding “that the intellectual property exception contained in §
230(e)(2) encompasses claims pertaining to an established intellectual
property right under federal law, like those inherent in a patent,
copyright, or trademark”).
(Id., 14a-15a).
In its decision, the District Court mentions a central case cited by Hepp for
the proposition that Perfect 10’s arrant sidestepping of the CDA’s plain-language is
erroneous. (Id., 14a). See Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04.
13
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Atlantic Recording Corp., along with key decisions from other circuits, crystalize
the semantic overreaching and interpretive legerdemain of Perfect 10’s errant
statutory construction. As the Atlantic Recording court astutely opined:
The problem with Playlist’s argument is that it lacks any support in the
plain language of the CDA. In four different points in Section 230(e),
Congress specified whether it intended a subsection to apply to local,
state, or federal law. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(e)(1) (“any other Federal
criminal statute”), (3) (“any State law” and “any State or local law”),
(4) (“any similar State law”) (emphasis added in all). It is therefore clear
from the statute that if Congress wanted the phrase “any law pertaining
to intellectual property” to actually mean “any federal law pertaining to
intellectual property,” it knew how to make that clear, but chose not to.
Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452, 122 S.Ct. 941,
151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) ( “[I]t is a general principle of statutory
construction that when Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); United States v. Gonzales, 520
U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (holding that “any
other term of imprisonment” includes both state and federal terms of
imprisonment because “Congress did not add any language limiting the
breadth of that word, and so we must read [the statute] as referring to
all ‘terms of imprisonment’”).
Moreover, the modifier “any” in Section 230(e)(2), employed without
any limiting language, “amounts to ‘expansive language [that] offers
no indication whatever that Congress intended [a] limiting
construction.’” Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 288,
299 (D.N.H.2008) (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589,
100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980)). This conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that, as discussed above, the “surrounding statutory
language” supports the conclusion that Congress intended the word
“any” to mean any state or federal law pertaining to intellectual
property. See ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir.2008)
(holding that word “any” in statute “deserves an expansive application
where the surrounding statutory language and other relevant legislative
context support it”).
14
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Because the plain language of the CDA is clear, as “any law” means
both state and federal law, the Court need not engage in an analysis of
the CDA’s legislative history or purpose. See Lee v. Bankers Trust Co.,
166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1999) (“It is axiomatic that the plain meaning
of a statute controls its interpretation and that judicial review must end
at the statute’s unambiguous terms. Legislative history and other tools
of interpretation may be relied upon only if the terms of the statute are
ambiguous.”) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, I conclude, as a matter of law, that Section 230(c)(1) does
not provide immunity for either federal or state intellectual property
claims. See Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 288 at 302
(rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 and holding that
“[c]onsistent with its text, § 230(e)(2) applies simply to ‘any law
pertaining to intellectual property,’ not just federal law.”); Murawski v.
Pataki, 514 F.Supp.2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (reading 230(c)(1) to
“immunize[ ] internet service providers from defamation and other,
non-intellectual property, state law claims arising from third-party
content”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.Supp.2d 409, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The instant claims are grounded in the law of
intellectual property and, therefore, do not, on a motion to dismiss,
implicate Section 230 immunity.”); Universal Commc’n Sys. v. Lycos,
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422-23 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating, in dicta, that
“[c]laims based on intellectual property laws are not subject to Section
230 immunity.”).
Id. at 703-4.
Although dismissive of Atlantic Recording, supra, and its highly elucidating
exegesis, the District Court offers no countervailing explanation – as a matter of pure
statutory construction – as to why § 230(e)’s inclusion of “any law pertaining to
intellectual property” does not apply to state-based right of publicity laws. As there
is no ambiguity of statutory interpretation here, there is no need for the District Court
to further consider judicial review based upon public policy considerations. See Lee
15
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v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1999).
However, assuming arguendo, the District Court’s public policy concerns,
they are likewise misplaced. First, the District Court’s concern that state-based
intellectual property laws “vary and are not uniform in their purposes and policy
goals” belies an entire cannon of diverse federal “common law.” (14a). Under
diversity and ancillary jurisdiction, federal district courts make daily decisions
interpreting admittedly varied and divergent state statutes and common law
regarding intellectual property law. In such cases, federal district courts necessarily
must opine upon laws that are not uniform from one state to another, an act that, in
itself, defies predictability.

But the fact that these decisions are potentially

anomalous does not vitiate the clear intent of § 230(e) of the CDA. Nor should the
Court be concerned with promoting predictability among state-based intellectual
property law decision-making that stems from the federal courts.
Likewise, the District Court’s reservation that recognition of a state-based
right of publicity exception to the CDA would “have a negative effect on the
development of the internet” reflects an outdated policy concern. (14a). In 2007,
when Perfect 10 was decided, the Internet with its concomitant limitless potential
for opening portals for commerce, public discourse, science, education and other
areas, was in its adolescence. Today, the Internet’s technological landscape has
changed drastically. While it may be true that the protections afforded Internet-based
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companies under §230 of the CDA initially played a crucial role in creating what is
now the modern Internet, the pendulum has swung fully, and Internet companies that
have openly relied upon §230 of the CDA since its codification have seen a recent
flourish of calls from both the executive and legislative branches of government
either to abolish the statute outright or reform it for varying unrelated reasons, the
scope of which falls outside of this Brief. (See, e.g., 9a-10a, n. 7).
As for professional broadcasters such as Hepp, the District Court’s holding is
clear: In a call to all Internet-based companies, the death knell of Pennsylvania’s
right of publicity has been rung. Hepp’s keen economic interest lies in the
commercial value attributed to her honed professional identity, which is exactly the
interest a right of publicity is intended to protect. (See Hepp AC ¶¶ 51,53-54,55;
56a-57a, 144a-148a,149a-164a). With clear immunity from any liability for right of
publicity violations, Defendants Imgur, Reddit, Facebook and WGCZ have no
incentive to monitor and/or remove protected materials from their sites – despite the
fact that such an exercise may be accomplished at relatively low cost given the
current technology. Moreover, anathema to individual property rights is the notion
that Hepp, who has dedicated considerable time, effort and money into building her
brand, is effectively disenfranchised by the District Court’s ruling.
II. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT IMMUNITY UNDER § 230(C) OF THE CDA
APPLIES TO STATE-BASED RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS,
ITS RELATIONAL RULING THAT HEPP’S MOTION TO
17
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AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD NKL AS A PARTY
DEFENDANT IS FUTILE IS THEREFORE IN ERROR AS WELL
BY IMPLICATION.
Grounding its decision upon its prior June 5, 2020 ruling -- that § 230(c) of
the CDA bars Hepp’s statutory and common law right of publicity claims -- the
District Court found that “further amendment of [her] pleadings would be futile,”
thus curtailing Hepp’s attempt to add NKL as a party defendant. (31a). Assuming
the fallacy in in the District Court’s prior ruling, a fortiori, its characterization of
Hepp’s motion to amend as “futile” is in error.
The District Court articulated the standard for allowing amendments to
pleadings as follows:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) has been interpreted to
liberally allow for the amendment of pleadings when justice so
requires; however, this privilege is not unfettered. Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Under certain circumstances, the denial of a
motion to amend is appropriate. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858,
864 (3d Cir. 1984). “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of
leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice,
and futility.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1434 (3d Cir. 1997). In “assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies
the same standard of legal sufficiency” used in 12(b)(6) motions. Id.
Accordingly, the court must “accept as true all the facts alleged in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them,”and deny a motion to amend only “where it is certain that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved.”
Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).
(24a-25a).
Assuming the District Court has not satisfied the “futility” element per
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Gould, supra, its subsequent decision to dismiss Hepp’s motion should be
reversed and remanded so that the record can be developed as to said claim.

III.ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT IMMUNITY UNDER § 230(C) OF THE CDA
APPLIES TO STATE-BASED RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS,
ITS RELATIONAL RULING THAT HEPP’S MOTION TO
AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD A COUNT FOR
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AS TO DEFENDANT WGCZ IS
FUTILE IS THEREFORE IN ERROR AS WELL BY
IMPLICATION.

Grounding its decision upon its prior June 5, 2020 ruling -- that § 230(c) of
the CDA bars Hepp’s statutory and common law right of publicity claims -- the
District Court found that “further amendment of [her] pleadings would be futile,”
thus curtailing Hepp’s attempt to amend her complaint to add a count for successor
liability as to Defendant WGCZ. (31a). Assuming the fallacy in in the District
Court’s prior ruling, a fortiori, its characterization of Hepp’s motion to amend as
“futile” is in error.
The District Court articulated the standard for allowing amendments to
pleadings as follows:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) has been interpreted to
liberally allow for the amendment of pleadings when justice so
requires; however, this privilege is not unfettered. Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Under certain circumstances, the denial of a
motion to amend is appropriate. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858,
19
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864 (3d Cir. 1984). “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of
leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice,
and futility.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1434 (3d Cir. 1997). In “assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies
the same standard of legal sufficiency” used in 12(b)(6) motions. Id.
Accordingly, the court must “accept as true all the facts alleged in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them,”and deny a motion to amend only “where it is certain that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved.”
Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).
(24a-25a).
Assuming the District Court has not satisfied the “futility” element per
Gould, supra, its subsequent decision to dismiss Hepp’s motion should be
reversed and remanded so that the record can be developed as to said claim.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT HEPP WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY AS TO
DEFENDANT WGCZ
With respect to its ruling on jurisdictional discovery, the District Court
found as follows:
Plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery because
she has failed to plausibly plead facts or identify any evidence to
make a threshold showing that specific personal jurisdiction
exists over WGCZ. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
facts that support personal jurisdiction. Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368.
Jurisdictional discovery is proper if the plaintiff has made a
prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. Toys “R”
Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003). To
satisfy this showing, Plaintiff must present “factual allegations
that suggest ‘with reasonable particularity’ the possible existence
of the requisite ‘contacts between [the party] and the forum
state,’” Id. at 456. If a plaintiff presents factual allegations that
satisfy this standard, “the plaintiff’s right to conduct
20
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jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.’” Id.
Based upon the following arguments, Hepp maintains that she has pleaded
facts sufficient to show that WGCZ (through successor liability) in operating the
XNXX.com website to warrant additional jurisdictional discovery.
A.

Hepp Meets the Zippo Sliding Scale Test

This Court has established that personal jurisdiction may be exercised based
on a defendant’s internet presence. See Ackourney v. Sonallas Custom Tailors, 573
F. App’x 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Determining if personal jurisdiction
exists requires the court to determine whether the defendant established minimum
contacts through cyberspace. See Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211 (citing Zippo, 952
F. Supp. at 1121); see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d at 452.
(“[Zippo] has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon
the operation of an internet website.”).
When analyzing these cases, courts must look to the “nature and quality of
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the internet.” See Zippo, 952 F.
Supp. at 1124. Accordingly, there exists a sliding scale that ranges from situations
where a defendant uses an interactive commercial website actively to transact
business with residents of a forum state (personal jurisdiction exists) to situations
where a passive website merely provides information that is accessible to users in
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the forum state (personal jurisdiction does not exist). See Ackourney, 573 F. App’x
at 211.
To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists for situations between these
extremes, the court must examine “the level of interactivity and commercial nature
of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.” Id.; see also Toys “R”
Us, 318 F.3d at 452. Additionally, the court must determine whether a defendant
“purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of engaging in activity in that state. See
Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 451. A defendant has “purposefully availed” itself if its
website repeatedly attracts business from a forum or knowingly conducts business
with the forum state’s residents via its site. Id. at 452; Doe v. Hesketh, 15 F. Supp.
3d 586, 597 (E.D. Pa 2014) (stating that “the Zippo sliding scale requires some
evidence of commercial interactivity with the forum state as where the Zippo
defendants solicited subscribers and entered into contracts to furnish services to
Pennsylvania customers”); see also UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. United Health
Services, Inc., Civ. No. 12-00485, 2013 WL 12086321, at 9 (M.D. Pa Mar. 26, 2013)
(“[T]he hallmark of a commercial site is not, ... the users submission or receipt of
information, but the clear presence of deliberate and repeated online business
transactions through which the host provides a good or service in return for monetary
compensation.”).
In the instant case, it is clear that the quality and nature of WGCZ’s internet
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activity falls at the interactive end of the Zippo spectrum: Its website, xnxx.com,
“has recently been rated the 181st most visited site globally, the 157th most visited
site in the United States, and receives about 16.3 million unique visitors per month
in the United States.” (See Fineman Decl.¶8, Ex.C; 200a).
Since WGCZ actively transacts business over the internet by providing an
interactive pornographic website that allows users to download millions of
pornographic images and videos (ostensibly for many Pennsylvania residents), this
Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. See Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). (“We have emphasized that parties who reach
out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with the
citizens of another state are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other State for
the consequences of their activities.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Zippo,
952 F. Supp. at 1126 (finding jurisdiction when a defendant used a website to
“contact with 3,000 individuals and seven internet access providers in
Pennsylvania”); see also Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., v. Tatro, 153 F. Supp.
3d, 714, 720-21 (E.D. Pa Dec. 29, 2015) (“[Defendant’s] website falls closer to the
interactive end of the Zippo spectrum ... visitors can search for various resources ...
[and] have the opportunity to purchase all these resources directly through the
website.”); Square D Co. v. Scott Elec. Co., Civ. No. 06-00459, 2008 WL 4462298,
at 8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) (ruling that website that required customers to provide
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phone number and e-mail address to engage in commercial activity supports
exercising of jurisdiction under Zippo analysis).
B.

WGCZ PURPOSELY AVAILED ITSELF

Moreover, WGCZ “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of engaging
in activity in Pennsylvania through continually providing an interactive platform by
which Pennsylvanians upload and download millions of pornographic images and
videos. (See Fineman Decl.¶8, Ex.C.; 200a); see also Law Sch. Admission Council,
153 F. Supp. 3d at 720-21 (finding that a defendant had “purposefully availed” itself
of activity in Pennsylvania when Pennsylvania residents made approximately 250
purchases on the defendant’s website); R.Q.C. Ltd. v. JKM Enters., Inc., Civ. No.
13-307, 2014 WL 4792148, at 4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2014) (“[A] defendant that
intentionally conducts business transactions over an interactive website with
customers in the forum state has purposefully directed itself of the laws of that
forum.”); Gentex Corp. v. Abbott, 978 F. Supp. 2d 391, 398 (M.D. P. a. 2013)
(finding that a defendant had “availed himself” to the forum state when “Defendant’s
website allowed Pennsylvania residents to make purchases through the site; it was
actually utilized to purchase a product that was subsequently shipped into
Pennsylvania”). Presumably, WGCZ tracks and retains metrices on how many
“hits,” downloads and click-throughs it receives for its Pennsylvania-based
subscribers and viewers. Based on the foregoing, Hepp submits that she has made a
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prima facie case warranting jurisdictional contacts premised upon successor liability.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff, Karen Hepp, respectfully submits
that the District Court’s Orders of June 5, 2020 and August 3, 2020, respectively,
dismissing her claims with prejudice in this action against Defendants,
Facebook, Inc., Imgur, Inc., Reddit, Inc. and WGCZ, S.R.O., on the basis of
statutory immunity under § 230(c) of the CDA, constituted fatal legal error.
Hepp’s appeal should therefore be granted, the District Court’s Order dismissing
her claims against all Defendants should be reversed, and this case should be
remanded so that Hepp can continue to prosecute her claims against DefendantsAppellees in the District Court below.

Respectfully submitted,
Samuel B. Fineman, Esq.
COHEN FINEMAN, LLC
Dated: December 7, 2020

By:

/s/Samuel B. Fineman
SAMUEL. B. FINEMAN (75717)
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREN HEPP,
Plaintiff
v.
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 19-4034-JMY

MEMORANDUM

YOUNGE, J.
I.

JUNE 5, 2020

INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of the use of an allegedly unauthorized photograph of Plaintiff Karen

Hepp, captured by a security camera in a New York City convenience store, that was then posted
by third-party users on the respective websites and social media platforms of Defendants
Facebook, Inc.; Imgur, Inc.; Reddit, Inc.; Giphy, Inc.; and foreign Defendant WCGZ, S.R.O.
(See Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 50.) Plaintiff asserts that she is a public
figure who has suffered harm from the unlawful dissemination and publication of her image, and
accordingly, she contends that Defendants have violated her common law and statutory right of
publicity.
Defendants Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit have each filed Motions to Dismiss (“MTD”)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting, inter alia, immunity
under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.1 (See Imgur MTD and

1

Giphy also filed a Motion to Dismiss (Giphy MTD, ECF No. 55). However, on May 13, 2020,
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Giphy from this lawsuit with prejudice. (ECF No. 74.) Accordingly,
Giphy’s Motion is no longer before the Court.
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Mem., ECF Nos. 53, 53-1; Reddit MTD and Mem., ECF Nos. 54, 54-1; Facebook MTD, ECF
No. 56 (collectively the “Motions to Dismiss”).) The Court finds this matter appropriate for
resolution without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7.1(f). For the reasons that follow,
the Motions to Dismiss will be granted based on CDA immunity.2
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background3

Plaintiff is a newscaster who has worked for the Philadelphia-based Fox 29 news team
since November 2010. (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.) She “is a co-anchor of the 4 am to 6 am hours of

As to Defendant WGCZ S.R.O., the Amended Complaint alleges that it is “is a limited liability
company existing under the laws of the Czech Republic” that “owns and operates ‘XNXX.com,’ a
popular adult-oriented website featuring pornographic materials.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.) WGCZ
S.R.O.’s counsel executed a waiver of service on February 28, 2020. (See ECF No. 68.) On May 28,
2020, WGCZ S.R.O. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2),
asserting lack of personal jurisdiction. (See WGCZ S.R.O. MTD, ECF No. 77.)) Plaintiff’s response to
WGCZ S.R.O.’s Motion is not due until June 11, 2020, (see Local Rule 7.1(c).). Because this Motion is
not yet ripe, it is not addressed in this Memorandum.
2

Imgur’s and Reddit’s Motions to Dismiss also assert that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction
because the Amended Complaint does not allege any suit-related contacts with this forum by either of
these Defendants. (See Imgur Mem. 4-10 and Reddit Mem. 9-12.) However, because Plaintiff’s claims
fail for the reason stated infra, the Court need not address personal jurisdiction over these Defendants.
See, e.g., 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067.6 (4th ed.
2020) (“Alternatively, when the jurisdictional question is complex or difficult, a court simply may avoid
the issue by resolving the suit on the merits when they clearly must be decided in favor of the party
challenging jurisdiction, thereby obviating any need to decide the question; that approach is possible even
when the jurisdictional issue lacks complexity.”); In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices
Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 329 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“To streamline the decision making, courts, in
situations where complex issues of personal jurisdiction exist and there is a pending motion which would
be dispositive in favor of the party over whom jurisdiction is disputed, may defer ruling on the motion to
dismiss and proceed to resolve the dispositive motion.”); see also Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x
586, 593 n.2 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Because the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety on the grounds of
CDA immunity and failure to state claims, we need not address Grindr Holding’s and KL Grindr’s
personal jurisdiction arguments.”).
3

The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are accepted as true and construed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 26263 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court also adopts the CM/ECF docketing system pagination.
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‘Good Day Philadelphia,’ a morning news program, and joins the set as co-host for the final hour
of the show from 9 am to 10 am.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Prior to working at Fox 29, Plaintiff worked for
other news organizations in New York City, Philadelphia, and Connecticut. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]pproximately two years ago, [she] discovered through her coworkers and managers, that, without her consent, a photograph of her taken by a security camera
in a convenience store in New York City was being used in online advertisements for erectile
dysfunction and dating websites.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff further alleges that she “was unaware that
her photograph had been taken” in the store, that she “does not know the identity or the location
of the store or how her photograph was secured,” and that she “has since learned that the
photograph has appeared illegally on many other websites.” (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.)
With regard to the moving Defendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows:


“[Her] photo was featured in a Facebook advertisement soliciting users to ‘meet and chat
with single women.’” (Id. ¶ 46.)



“[Her] photo was featured on Imgur under the heading ‘milf,’ which is a derogatory and
degrading slang acronym that refers to a sexually attractive woman with young children.”
(Id. ¶ 47.)



“[Her] photo was featured on Reddit titled ‘Amazing’ in the subgroup r/obsf (‘older but
still $#^@able’) and posted by a user known as ‘pepsi_next.’ There is a hyperlink for the
photograph which links to the Imgur site.” (Id. ¶ 48.)

The Amended Complaint also references and attaches as exhibits images and internet addresses
of the websites on which her image appeared.4 (Id. ¶¶ 46-48, Exs. L-M.) Significantly, the
Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendants Facebook, Imgur, or Reddit created,
authored, or directly published the content that is the subject of this lawsuit. (See generally, Am.
Compl.)

4

These exhibits and internet addresses include those related to former Defendant Giphy, which
has been dismissed from this action.
3
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Plaintiff alleges that the unauthorized dissemination of her image impacts her
“image/brand on social media sites” and her “social media ranking” on sites such as Instagram
and Twitter. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 51-55.) In the specific counts of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that “Defendants’ actions with respect to [her] image have caused serious, permanent and
irreparable harm” to “Plaintiff’s reputation, brand and image.” (Id. ¶ 71; see also id. ¶ 64.)
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action on September 4, 2019, asserting in her original Complaint
claims against Facebook, Imgur, Reddit, Giphy, WCGZ, S.R.O., and Does 1-10,5 alleging a
claim for violation of 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and a claim under the
Pennsylvania common law right of publicity (Count II). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Subsequently,
Defendants Imgur, Giphy, Reddit, and Facebook filed motions to dismiss the Complaint. (See
ECF Nos. 29, 45, 46, 47.)
On February 18, 2020, while the motions to dismiss the original Complaint were pending,
Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, again asserting claims against the above-noted
Defendants under 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and the Pennsylvania
common law right of publicity (Count II). (See generally Am. Compl.) Accordingly, the Court
dismissed the motions to dismiss the original Complaint as moot. (See ECF No. 51.) In
response to the Amended Complaint, Defendants Imgur, Reddit, and Facebook filed the Motions
that are the subject of this Memorandum. 6

5

Plaintiff alleges that the Doe Defendants are “the owners and operators of other websites and/or
media outlets” who either performed the acts alleged, “acted as agents, principals, alter egos, employees,
or representatives of the other Defendants,” or “otherwise participated in the acts alleged with the other
Defendants.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.)
6

When the motions to dismiss the original Complaint were filed, Plaintiff had not yet
demonstrated proof of service of the Complaint on the foreign Defendant, WCGZ, S.R.O. (See ECF Nos.
34, 43.) Plaintiff later effected service upon WCGZ, S.R.O. pursuant to the Hague Convention and, as
4
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III.

LEGAL STANDARD
The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is set

forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). After Iqbal, it is clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to
defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive dismissal, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Tatis v. Allied Interstate,
LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Facial plausibility is
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678). Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Our Court of Appeals requires us to apply a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6) motion:
(1) “[the district court] must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a
claim;” (2) “it should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth;’” and, (3) “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir.
2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). The plausibility determination is a “context-specific

noted above, its counsel executed a waiver of service. (See ECF Nos. 52, 68.) The current Motions to
Dismiss were filed before Defendant WCGZ, S.R.O.’s response to the Amended Complaint was due. As
further noted above, WCGZ, S.R.O. has since filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, which
Motion is not yet ripe for decision.
5
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task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
IV.

DISCUSSION
The moving Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s statutory and common law right of

publicity claims are barred by § 230(c) of the CDA. (See ECF Nos. 53-1 at 15-18, 54-1 at 20-22,
and 56-1 at 9-16.) Recognizing that § 230(c) creates a safe harbor for internet service providers,
Plaintiff argues that § 230(e)(2) carves out an exception for claims pertaining to state intellectual
property rights. (See ECF No. 61 at 2.) This presents an issue of first impression not yet decided
by our Third Circuit—whether CDA immunity extends to cases alleging infringement by an
internet service provider in violation of the various and differing state right of publicity laws.
A.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act

The CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider,” and expressly preempts any state law to the contrary. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3).
In other words, internet service providers are not liable for third-party content. Section 230
“creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470-71 (3d Cir.
2003). Under the statute there are, however, certain causes of action that are specifically not
barred by § 230(c), including “any law pertaining to intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(2).
“Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a

6
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minimum.” Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330. In fact, many courts have observed that § 230 immunity
should be broadly construed so as to implement Congress’s policy choice. See Saponaro v.
Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319, 325 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[T]he CDA manifests a Congressional
policy supporting broad immunity.”). In enacting the CDA, Congress stressed that “[t]he
Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). The statute further reads that the “policy of the United States”
is to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation[.]” Id. § 230(b)(2).
Considering this express policy, some courts have found that “[h]olding interactive service
providers liable for third-party communications would have chilling implications for free speech
on the internet.” Saponaro, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 325; see also Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523,
528 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that without CDA protection, interactive computer services would
either have to “employ an army of highly-trained monitors to patrol” its services, or “shut down”
internet forums altogether).7

7

The Court recognizes that on May 28, 2020, President Donald J. Trump issued an Executive
Order relating to Section 230(c) (the “Executive Order”), which appears to be directed at preventing
censorship by online platforms such as the moving Defendants in this case. See Executive Order On
Preventing Online Censorship, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executiveorder-preventing-online-censorship/ (last accessed June 4, 2020). The Policy section of the Executive
Order states, in part:
In a country that has long cherished the freedom of expression, we cannot allow a limited
number of online platforms to hand pick the speech that Americans may access and convey
on the internet. This practice is fundamentally un-American and anti-democratic.
***
Online platforms are engaging in selective censorship that is harming our national
discourse. Tens of thousands of Americans have reported, among other troubling
behaviors, online platforms “flagging” content as inappropriate, even though it does not
violate any stated terms of service; making unannounced and unexplained changes to
company policies that have the effect of disfavoring certain viewpoints; and deleting
content and entire accounts with no warning, no rationale, and no recourse.
Id. § 1. Policy.
7
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B.

Defendants Meet the Criteria for Immunity under the CDA

“The elements required for Section 230(c) immunity are: (1) that the defendant is a
provider or user of an ‘interactive computer service;’ (2) that the asserted claims treat the
defendant as the publisher or speaker of the information; and (3) that the information is provided
by another ‘information content provider.’” Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 838 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)); see also Dimeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
First, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit are all
providers of an “interactive computer service,” as defined in § 230(f)(2). (See generally ECF
Nos. 58 at 12-15, 60 at 11-15, 61 at 2-5.) The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as
“any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server[.]” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Here, all three
Defendants fall squarely within that definition as providers of a website or social media platform,
namely, “Facebook owns and operates . . . one of the world’s largest social media internet
sites[,]” “Imgur is an internet-based online image-sharing business[,]” and “Reddit is an
American social news aggregation company[.]” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 21.) Furthermore, this
Court agrees with the other courts that have held that same or similar social media platforms fit
the definition of an “interactive computer service” provider. See, e.g., Shulman v.
Facebook.com, No. 17-764, 2018 WL 3344236, at *7 (D.N.J. July 9, 2018) (concluding that
Facebook is an interactive computer service); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp.3d 1116, 1121

The Executive Order is the subject of a lawsuit filed June 2, 2020, which alleges that the
Executive Order violates the First Amendment and “seeks to curtail and chill the constitutionally
protected speech of all online platforms and individuals.” See Complaint, Ctr. for Democracy &
Tech. v. Donald J. Trump, No. 20-1456-TNM (D.D.C. June 2, 2020), ECF No. 1. Having reviewed the
Executive Order and the context in which it was issued, the Court finds that it does not alter the
Court’s analysis of the CDA immunity issue in this case.
8
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(N.D. Cal. 2016) (noting that Twitter is an interactive computer service provider); Marfione v.
KAI U.S.A., Ltd., No. 17-70, 2018 WL 1519042, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2018) (finding
Instagram an interactive computer service); see also Mmubango v. Google, Inc., No. 12-1300,
2013 WL 664231, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013) (“Google is an interactive computer service
provider.”).
Second, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for information provided by another
information content provider. Under the statute, an “‘information content provider’ means any
person or entity that is responsible . . . for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). “If a
defendant did not create or author the statement in controversy, but rather is provided that
statement by a third-party information content provider, then that defendant cannot be held liable
under the CDA.” Mmubango, 2013 WL 664231, at *2 (holding that the CDA immunizes the
defendant against the plaintiff’s claims for defamation and negligence). Here, Plaintiff does not
explicitly allege that Facebook, Imgur, or Reddit created or developed the offending content (i.e.,
postings, advertisements, and short-looping videos that utilized Plaintiff’s image). Rather, it is
reasonable to infer from the allegations in the Amended Complaint, and the exhibits attached
thereto, that Defendants merely allowed the offending content to be posted on their respective
platforms via third-party users. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-48; see also Ex.’s L-N.)
Lastly, Plaintiff’s claims seek to treat each Defendant as a “publisher or speaker” of the
content posted by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “The Third Circuit has held the CDA
immunizes traditional publisher conduct, such as ‘deciding whether to publish, withdraw, or alter
content.’” Obado v. Magedson, No. 13-2382, 2014 WL 3778261, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014)
(citing Green, 318 F.3d at 471). For the Defendants here, such decisions “involve deciding
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whether to provide access to third-party content or whether to delete the content from [their]
archiv[e] or cache.” Mmubango, at *2. Thus, because Plaintiff’s claims are premised on thirdparty-posted content that were hosted on each Defendants’ respective platforms, these claims are
not actionable under § 230.
In summary, the Court finds that Defendants meet the criteria for immunity under § 230
of the CDA.
C.

Plaintiff’s Right of Publicity Claims Do Not Qualify for the “Any Law
Pertaining to Intellectual Property” Exclusion

With respect to the CDA’s exclusion for “any law pertaining to intellectual property[,]”
the Court recognizes there that there is a split of authority over the scope of this exclusion. See
47 U.S.C. §230(e)(2). Specifically, there is disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and some
district courts over whether the CDA preempts state law intellectual property claims. Compare,
e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
CDA preempted a state right of publicity claim); Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v.
Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We have observed before that
because Congress did not define the term ‘intellectual property law,’ it should be construed
narrowly to advance the CDA’s express policy of providing broad immunity.”); with Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding that the CDA did
not preempt plaintiff’s right of publicity claim); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist,
Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Section 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity
for either federal or state intellectual property claims.”).8 Plaintiff relies primarily upon the

8

Moreover, the Court’s research has yielded no case law from any other appellate courts that has
clearly resolved whether the CDA preempts right of publicity claims. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 26 n.9 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting the split of authority over whether the
CDA preempts right of publicity claims but not taking a position where plaintiffs’ claims failed otherwise
on the merits); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing but not
10
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decision in Atlantic Recording Corp. to argue that her right of publicity claims are not preempted
by the CDA. (See ECF Nos. 58 at 13-14, 60 at 12-13, 61 at 3-4.) However, for the reasons
discussed further below, the Court declines to follow the district court opinion in Atlantic
Recording Corp., and instead finds that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 is more
consistent with the statutory text and purpose of § 230(c).
In Perfect 10, a magazine publisher sued an online credit card processing company.
Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1108. Claiming that the defendant improperly used the plaintiff’s
copyrighted images, the plaintiff brought several state intellectual property claims, including an
alleged violation of the right of publicity. Id. The defendant raised § 230 as a defense to this
claim, but the district court summarily denied immunity. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that the defendant was entitled to § 230 immunity against plaintiff’s right of
publicity claim, stating that the term ‘intellectual property’ is not defined in the statute, and that
“[s]tates have any number of laws that could be characterized as intellectual property laws:
trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of publicity and trade defamation, to name just a
few.” Id. at 1107. The court noted that “[b]ecause such laws vary widely from state to state, no
litigant will know if he is entitled to immunity for a state claim until a court decides the legal
issue.” Id. The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that “[a]s a practical matter, inclusion of rights
protected by state law within the ‘intellectual property’ exemption would fatally undermine the

deciding the “difficult issues” of whether the CDA applies to a right of publicity claim, even though
“there appears to be no dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual property right”). Further,
the Court’s research has revealed no district court opinion within the Third Circuit that has squarely
determined the issue. See, e.g., Parker v. Paypal, No. 16-4786, 2017 WL 3508759, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
16, 2017) (holding, without discussing § 230(e)(2), that plaintiff’s claim for right of publicity under
California law was “clearly preempted and prohibited by § 230”); Obado, at *7 n.5 (noting the Ninth
Circuit’s position but finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a right of publicity violation and
therefore it was unnecessary to decide whether the claim was excluded from CDA preemption); but see
Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., No. 13-2477, 2013 WL 4426359, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013)
(holding plaintiff’s claim under Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute preempted by the CDA).
11
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broad grant of immunity provided by the CDA.” Id. at 1108. The Ninth Circuit did not
expressly find the language of § 230(e)(2) to be ambiguous. Rather, citing § 230(a) and (b), it
construed the term “intellectual property” in subsection (e)(2) to mean “federal intellectual
property,” in light of “Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet
from the various state-law regimes.” Id. at 1118. By contrast, the district court opinion cited by
Plaintiff, which criticizes the Ninth Circuit, focuses solely on the language of § 230(e) and
declines to consider the codified policy objectives. See Atlantic Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp.
2d at 703-04.
This Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Perfect 10. State laws that could arguably be
construed as implicating “intellectual property” vary and are not uniform in their purposes and
policy goals. Conditioning CDA immunity on the diverse potentially applicable state laws
would have a negative effect on the development of the internet, and, therefore, would run
contrary to the purpose and intent of the CDA. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Perfect 10:
While the scope of federal intellectual property law is relatively
well-established, state laws protecting “intellectual property,”
however defined, are by no means uniform. Such laws may bear
various names, provide for varying causes of action and remedies,
and have varying purposes and policy goals. Because material on a
website may be viewed across the Internet, and thus in more than
one state at a time, permitting the reach of any particular state's
definition of intellectual property to dictate the contours of this
federal immunity would be contrary to Congress's expressed goal
of insulating the development of the Internet from the various
state-law regimes.
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118; see also Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d
1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016) (“When deciding whether a class of people qualify for immunity
from suit, we look for that intent to be expressed in an explicit statutory or constitutional
guarantee of immunity.” (citing Szehinkyzj v. Attorney Gen., 432 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2005))).

12
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In this Court’s view, construing § 230(e)(2) as preserving only federal intellectual property
claims is most fitting because this interpretation simultaneously maintains broad immunity in
line with the CDA’s stated congressional purpose. This preserves the scope of immunity within
a predictable body of federal law as opposed to the diverse state law on the subject matter. See
Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 946 F.3d at 1053 (holding “that the intellectual property
exception contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses claims pertaining to an established intellectual
property right under federal law, like those inherent in a patent, copyright, or trademark”).
Accordingly, the Court holds that only federal intellectual property claims are excluded
from the scope of CDA immunity, and for this reason, Plaintiff’s statutory and common law right
of publicity claims are barred by § 230(c) of the CDA.9
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will grant the respective Motions of

Defendants Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit. An appropriate Order will follow.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge
Judge John Milton Younge

9

The Court recognizes that Defendants advance other arguments under Fed. R. 12(b)(6);
however, given that the Court concludes Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the CDA, the Court need not
address these additional arguments.
13
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREN HEPP,
Plaintiff
v.
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 19-4034-JMY

ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of June, 2020, upon consideration of the Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Imgur, Inc.; Reddit, Inc.; and Facebook,
Inc., (see ECF Nos. 53, 54, 56), and all documents submitted in support thereof and in opposition
thereto, it is ORDERED that:
(1) Imgur, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED, and Imgur, Inc. is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action;
(2) Reddit, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 54) is GRANTED, and Reddit, Inc. is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action; and
(3) Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 56) is GRANTED, and Facebook, Inc. is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by
former Defendant Giphy, Inc. (ECF No. 55) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.1

1

On May 13, 2020, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Giphy from this lawsuit with prejudice. (ECF

No. 74.)
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge
Judge John Milton Younge
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREN HEPP,
Plaintiff
v.
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 19-4034-JMY

MEMORANDUM
YOUNGE, J.
I.

AUGUST 3 , 2020

INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of an allegedly unauthorized photograph of Plaintiff Karen Hepp,

which was captured by a security camera in a New York City convenience store and then was
posted by third-party users on several websites and social media platforms, including that of
Defendant WGCZ, S.R.O. (“WGCZ”). (See generally, Am. Compl., ECF No. 50.) Plaintiff
asserts that she is a public figure who has suffered harm from the unlawful dissemination and
publication of her image and, accordingly, she asserts claims against WGCZ for alleged violation
of her common law and statutory right of publicity.
Presently before the Court is WGCZ’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
(WGCZ Mot., ECF No. 77.) WGCZ argues that it should be dismissed from this action based on
a lack of personal jurisdiction. (Id. at 1.) In response to WGCZ’s Motion, Plaintiff filed an
Opposition and a Cross-Motion to Amend the Complaint to Add a Count for Successor Liability
and to Add a Party. (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot., ECF No. 83.) Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion seeks to add
as an additional defendant an entity named NKL Associates, S.R.O. (“NKL”), which Plaintiff
contends is a successor company to WGCZ. (Id.; see also Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. 2, ECF
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No. 83-6.) For the reasons that follow, WGCZ’s Motion will be granted, Plaintiff’s CrossMotion to Amend will be denied, and Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed.
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background 1

Plaintiff is a newscaster who has worked for the Philadelphia-based Fox 29 news team
since November 2010. (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.) She “is a co-anchor of the 4 am to 6 am hours of
‘Good Day Philadelphia,’ a morning news program, and joins the set as co-host for the final hour
of the show from 9 am to 10 am.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Prior to working at Fox 29, Plaintiff worked for
other news organizations in New York City, Philadelphia, and Connecticut. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]pproximately two years ago, [she] discovered through her coworkers and managers, that, without her consent, a photograph of her taken by a security camera
in a convenience store in New York City was being used in online advertisements for erectile
dysfunction and dating websites.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff further alleges that she “was unaware that
her photograph had been taken” in the store, that she “does not know the identity or the location
of the store or how her photograph was secured,” and that she “has since learned that the
photograph has appeared illegally on many other websites.” (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.) The Amended
Complaint also references and attaches as exhibits images and internet addresses of the websites
on which her image appeared. (Id. ¶¶ 46-48, Exs. L-P.) Plaintiff alleges that the unauthorized
dissemination of her image has negatively impacted her “image/brand on social media sites” and
her “social media ranking” on sites such as Instagram and Twitter. (See id. ¶¶ 51-55.) Plaintiff

1

The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are accepted as true and construed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 26263 (3d Cir. 2008).

2
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alleges that “Defendants’ actions with respect to [her] image have caused serious, permanent and
irreparable harm” to “Plaintiff’s reputation, brand and image.” (Id. ¶¶ 64, 71.)
With regard to moving Defendant WGCZ, Plaintiff alleges that it “is a limited liability
company existing under the laws of the Czech Republic.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that
WGCZ “owns and operates ‘XNXX.com,’ a popular adult-oriented website featuring
pornographic materials.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges that her photo “was featured on the XNXX
site in the ‘milf’ gallery 44/46 and can be easily downloaded. The XNXX site url address is:
https://multi.xnxx.com/gallery/1116129/a34b/milf_gallery_44_46/.” 2 (Id. ¶ 50, Ex. P.) Review
of Exhibit P indicates that the Plaintiff’s photograph was posted on XNXX.com by a third party
or parties. (Id. Ex P.) Specifically, Exhibit P states: “Photos uploaded to: xnxx.com / forum by
endzeitH - NylonLuver - DebbyLynn - Ginger Snap - easytiger511111.” (Id.) The screenshot
depicted in Exhibit P is undated and contains nothing to establish when it was uploaded to
XNXX.com. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege, either in her Amended Complaint or in
her Opposition and Cross-Motion to Amend, that WGCZ or NKL authored, created, or
developed the photograph of Plaintiff that is the subject of this lawsuit. (See generally, Am.
Compl.; see also Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. at 6 (stating that WGCZ “provid[es] an interactive
pornographic website that allows users to download millions of pornographic images and
videos. . . .” (emphasis added).))
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action on September 4, 2019, asserting in her original Complaint
claims against Facebook, Inc.; Imgur, Inc.; Reddit, Inc.; Giphy, Inc.; WGCZ; and Does 1-10, for

2

The Amended Complaint alleges that “milf” is “a derogatory and degrading slang acronym that
refers to a sexually attractive woman with young children.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 47.)

3
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violation of 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and under the Pennsylvania
common law right of publicity (Count II). 3 (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Subsequently, Defendants
Imgur, Giphy, Reddit, and Facebook filed motions to dismiss the Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 29,
45, 46, 47.) When the motions to dismiss the original Complaint were filed, Plaintiff had not yet
demonstrated proof of service of the Complaint on WGCZ. (See ECF Nos. 34, 43.) Plaintiff
later effected service on WGCZ pursuant to the Hague Convention, and WGCZ’s counsel
executed a waiver of service. (See ECF Nos. 52, 68.)
On February 18, 2020, while the other Defendants’ motions to dismiss the original
Complaint were pending, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, again asserting claims against
all of the above-noted Defendants under 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316 (Count I), and
the Pennsylvania common law right of publicity (Count II). (See generally Am. Compl.)
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the motions to dismiss the original Complaint as moot. (See
ECF No. 51.) On March 3, 2020, Defendants Imgur, Reddit, Giphy, and Facebook filed motions
to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 53-56.) Subsequently, Plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed her claims against Giphy with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(i). (ECF No. 74.) On June 5, 2020, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order
granting the motions to dismiss filed by Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit, and dismissing Plaintiff’s
action as to those Defendants with prejudice. (6/5/20 Mem., ECF No. 81; 6/5/20 Order, ECF No.
82.) In granting these motions to dismiss, the Court concluded that Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit

3

Plaintiff alleges that the Doe Defendants are “the owners and operators of other websites and/or
media outlets” who either performed the acts alleged, “acted as agents, principals, alter egos, employees,
or representatives of the other Defendants,” or “otherwise participated in the acts alleged with the other
Defendants.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff has not yet identified or served the Doe Defendants.

4
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are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Section 230(c) of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). (See 6/5/20 Mem. at 2, 8-10.)
Shortly before the Court issued its June 5, 2020 Memorandum and Order, WGCZ filed
the Motion to Dismiss that is currently before the Court. (See WGCZ Mot.) Plaintiff filed her
Opposition and Cross-Motion on June 11, 2020, and, on June 18, 2020, WGCZ filed a Reply in
support of its Motion and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion. (ECF No. 84.)
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Personal Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(2)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a court “must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and
construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361,
368 (3d Cir. 2002). If no evidentiary hearing is held on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need
only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc., v. Smith, 384
F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). A plaintiff has the burden to establish “with reasonable particularity
sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat.
Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Action Mfg. Co. v. Simon
Wrecking Co., 375 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (A plaintiff satisfies this prima
facie standard by presenting facts that, if true, would permit the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendant.).
However, when a defendant challenges a court’s personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must
then establish its existence. O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir.
2007). The plaintiff meets this burden by “establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient
contacts between the defendant and the forum state to support jurisdiction.” Provident Nat’l

5
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Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987). The plaintiff
may not “rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant’s . . . motion to
dismiss” for lack of personal jurisdiction. Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735
F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984). Instead, the “plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere
allegations.” Id.
A federal court entertaining a suit must possess one of two forms of personal jurisdiction
over each defendant. The first form, known as specific jurisdiction, requires that the plaintiff’s
claim arise from the defendant’s contacts with the forum in which the court sits. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984). In contrast, the court may
exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant who possesses systematic and continuous contacts
with the forum regardless of whether the plaintiff’s claim derives from the defendant’s in-forum
activities. Id. at 415 n.9; see also Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d 2007). The court
must determine whether to exercise either form of jurisdiction in light of the “relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
“[S]pecifc jurisdiction exists when the claim arises from or relates to conduct purposely
directed at the forum state.” Marten, 499 F.3d at 296. Determining whether specific jurisdiction
exists involves a three-part inquiry. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. First, the defendant must have
“‘purposefully directed’ his activities” at the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985). Second, the plaintiff’s claim must “arise out of or relate to” at least one of those
specific activities. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. Third, courts may consider additional factors
to ensure that the assertion of jurisdiction otherwise “comport[s] with ‘fair play and substantial
justice.’” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. “There must be a ‘deliberate targeting of the forum’
and ‘contacts with a state’s citizens that take place outside the state are not purposeful contacts

6
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with the state itself.’” Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 455, 463-464 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(quoting O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317). “Moreover, ‘the defendant must have purposefully
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum.’” Id. at 464 (quoting
O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (alteration in original)).
In cases where the alleged wrongdoing sounds in tort, the personal jurisdiction inquiry
employs an effects test to determine whether purposeful direction exists. Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783 (1984). Under this test, personal jurisdiction can be based on: (1) an intentional tort;
(2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered — and
which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered — in the forum state. See IMO Indus., Inc.,
v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-266 (3d Cir. 1998); Lutz, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 466. Only if the
“expressly aimed” element of the effects test is met does the court need to consider the other two
elements. Marten, 499 F.3d at 297.
B.

Leave to Amend Under Rule 15(a)

The Plaintiff moves to amend her Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a), which states that “leave [to amend a pleading] shall be freely given when
justices so requires.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) has been interpreted to liberally
allow for the amendment of pleadings when justice so requires; however, this privilege is not
unfettered. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Under certain circumstances, the denial
of a motion to amend is appropriate. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984).
“Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith,
dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). In “assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies the same standard of
legal sufficiency” used in 12(b)(6) motions. Id. Accordingly, the court must “accept as true all

7
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the facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,”
and deny a motion to amend only “where it is certain that no relief could be granted under any
set of facts that could be proved.” Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.
1990).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over WGCZ 4
1.

The Parties’ Arguments

As a threshold matter, WGCZ argues that it is not subject to specific jurisdiction because
it did not own or operate the XNXX.com website when the offending photograph of Plaintiff was
displayed on that site. (WGCZ Mem. at 7.) Putting ownership of the website to one side,
WGCZ also contends that specific jurisdiction is lacking because: (1) Plaintiff has not alleged
that WGCZ committed any acts aimed or purposely directed to Pennsylvania; (2) Plaintiff has
not alleged that her claims arise out of or relate to WGCZ’s contacts with Pennsylvania; and (3)
exercising jurisdiction over WGCZ “would be unreasonable and would fail to ‘comport with fair
play and substantial justice.’” (WGCZ Mem. 6-8 (quoting Lutz, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 464).)
In support of its arguments, WGCZ offers the Declaration of Robert Seifert, the
administrative director for both WGCZ and NKL. (Seifert Decl. ¶¶ 1, 9, ECF No. 77-2.) Seifert
states that “WGCZ does not own or operate the website XNXX.com, or any other websites
mentioned in the [A]mended [C]omplaint,” and it has not owned or operated XNXX.com since

4

Plaintiff does not contend that WGCZ is subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. (See
Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Motion Mem. at 3-4; see also WGCZ Mem. 5-6, ECF No. 77-1.) The Court agrees that
no basis exists to conclude that WGCZ “maintained systematic and continuous contacts with
[Pennsylvania]” as necessary to support the exercise of general jurisdiction. Marten, 499 F.3d at 296.
.

8
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May of 2014, when WGCZ transferred ownership and operation of the site to NKL. (Id. ¶¶ 4,
10, 11.) Seifert further attests that:
WGCZ never has had and does not now have an office in Pennsylvania, and it is
not registered to do business in Pennsylvania. WGCZ has no Pennsylvania-based
business operations, no Pennsylvania employees, owns no Pennsylvania property,
rents no Pennsylvania property, and pays no Pennsylvania state taxes. WGCZ does
not hold any Pennsylvania bank accounts, has no Pennsylvania mailing address or
phone numbers, and does not have any designated agents residing in, domiciled in,
or doing business from Pennsylvania. WGCZ also does not sell products or provide
any services intentionally directed or aimed at Pennsylvania. None of WGCZ’s
officers or directors reside in or are domiciled in Pennsylvania. . . . WGCZ has
never filed a lawsuit in Pennylvania, nor has it sought the protection of any
Pennsylvania laws.
(Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Finally, Seifert states that: WGCZ “did not expressly aim or purposefully direct
any conduct relating to the [A]mended [C]omplaint toward Pennsylvania or any Pennsylvania
resident. . . . WGCZ has not purposefully availed itself of the benefits or protections of the laws
of Pennsylvania; WGCZ does not operate any servers in Pennsylvania; . . . WGCZ has not
received any revenue from any website, photograph or image at issue in this case, and . . .
WGCZ has no physical or business presence in Pennsylvania.” (Id. ¶¶ 11.)
Plaintiff, in turn, argues that specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate based on
WGCZ’s internet presence and based on the theory that WGCZ purposefully availed itself of the
benefits and privileges of conducting business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Pl.’s
Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. at 4-7.) In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to Ackourney v.
Sonallas Custom Tailors, 573 F. App’x 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2014), and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997). These cases stand for the
proposition that specific jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant that establishes
minimum contact with a forum through cyberspace based commercial activities over the internet.
Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211; Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123-24.

9
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2.

Plaintiff Fails to Plausibly Allege Specific Jurisdiction Over WGCZ

Plaintiff’s jurisdictional arguments as to WGCZ lack merit for two related reasons. First,
Plaintiff fails to identify plausible allegations or evidence to suggest that XNXX.com was owned
or operated by WGCZ when the allegedly offending conduct occurred. Plaintiff cannot establish
specific jurisdiction as to WGCZ if it did not own or operate XNXX.com during the relevant
time period because, a fortiori, if it did not own or operate the site, WGCZ would not be
responsible for purposely directing the offending content to Pennsylvania.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff merely alleges that WGCZ was organized under the
laws of the Czech Republic and that it owns and operates XNXX.com. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.)
However, according to the Seifert Declaration, XNXX.com has not been owned or operated by
WGCZ since May of 2014. (Seifert Decl. ¶ 10.) WGCZ also produced a copy of the Terms of
Service for XNXX.com, which identify NKL as the owner and operator of XNXX.com. (Id., Ex.
A.) Plaintiff herself relies upon a World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) arbitration
decision filed on April 28, 2020, in NKL Associates S.R.O. v. WhoisGuard Protected,
WhoisGuard, Inc. / James Andrade, Case No. D2020-0662. (Pl.’s Opp./Cross Mot. Ex. C, ECF
No. 83-4.) However, this decision identifies NKL as the owner and operator of XNXX.com.
Plaintiff also cites to a WIPO arbitration decision in WGCZ S.R.O. v. Whois Privacy
Services Pty Ltd./Murat Yikilmaz, Case No. D2014-0492. (Id., Ex. A, ECF No. 83-2.)
However, this WIPO decision was issued on June 17, 2014, and it pertains to a domain name
dispute that arose from events that transpired well before May of 2014, when, according to
Seifert, NKL assumed ownership and operation of XNXX.com. (Id.) This decision does nothing
to contradict the Seifert Declaration and does not establish WGCZ’s ownership or control over
XNXX.com after May of 2014. In short, Plaintiff has not identified any credible evidence to

10
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counter the Seifert Declaration, nor any evidence to indicate that WGCZ owned or operated
XNXX.com at the time when Plaintiff’s image appeared on that site.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the sliding scale internet test is similarly misplaced. (See Pl.’s
Opp./Cross-Mot. Mem. 4-6 (citing Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211; Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 112324 (W.D. Pa. 1997).) Under this test, courts assess whether the defendant established minimum
contacts through cyberspace. Ackourney, 573 F. App’x at 211. Courts conducting this
assessment must look to the “nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts
over the internet.” Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. The court must examine “the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the website.”
Id. A passive website that does little more than make information available to those who are
interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Ackourney, 573 App’x at
212. The middle ground is occupied by interactive websites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the website. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
Plaintiff alleges that WGCZ has purposely availed itself of the benefits and privileges of
conducting business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by maintaining a website that offers
a high degree of interactivity. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4 (“[A]ll Defendants purposely avail themselves of
conducting activities within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and their respective websites
actively engage Pennsylvania-based users and offer a high degree of interactivity with same.”).)
Plaintiff argues that specific jurisdiction is proper because WGCZ has a vast internet business
that reaches into the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff cites to the existence of
XNXX.com as the foundation for her argument. Plaintiff argues that XNXX.com is the “181st

11
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most visited site globally, the 157th most visited site in the United States, and receives about
16.3 million unique visitors per month in the United States.” (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Motion at 5.)
Plaintiff points to this internet presence and argues that WGCZ has Pennsylvania customers who
uploaded and downloaded millions of pornographic images and videos. (Id. at 6.) Critically,
however, this argument ignores the absence of any evidence that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of or
relate to WGCZ’s alleged internet presence with respect to XNXX.com., which according to the
unrebutted Seifert Declaration, was owned and operated by another entity, NKL. WGCZ’s
operation of other allegedly interactive websites does not support personal jurisdiction in this
case because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of and are not related to those alleged websites.
Plaintiff’s argument does not satisfy the requirement that specific personal jurisdiction exists
only if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s specific activities.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
3.

Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery because she has failed to plausibly
plead facts or identify any evidence to make a threshold showing that specific personal
jurisdiction exists over WGCZ. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that support
personal jurisdiction. Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368. Jurisdictional discovery is proper if the plaintiff
has made a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two,
S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003). To satisfy this showing, Plaintiff must present “factual
allegations that suggest ‘with reasonable particularity’ the possible existence of the requisite
‘contacts between [the party] and the forum state,’” Id. at 456. If a plaintiff presents factual
allegations that satisfy this standard, “the plaintiff’s right to conduct jurisdictional discovery
should be sustained.’” Id. However, the Third Circuit has also held that “a mere unsupported

12
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allegation that the defendant ‘transacts business’ in an area is ‘clearly frivolous”’ for purposes of
determining whether jurisdictional discovery is warranted. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v.
Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s denial of
jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff merely averred that defendant conducted business in the
forum).
The allegation that WGCZ conducts business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
amounts to nothing more than a bare allegation that cannot support a request to conduct
jurisdictional discovery. Id. As noted above, Plaintiff’s allegations related to WGCZ’s
ownership and operation of XNXX.com are unsubstantiated in the record. Plaintiff offers no
explanation of how jurisdictional discovery will reveal the requisite contacts or purposely
directed activities necessary to establish specific jurisdiction over WGCZ. Bare allegations,
without factual support, are insufficient to permit Plaintiff to conduct a fishing expedition under
the guise of jurisdictional discovery. Crockett v. Luitpold Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 19-0276,
2020 WL 3096527, at *5 n.6 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2020); Katz v. DNC Serv. Corp., No. 16-5800,
2017 WL 5885672, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2017) (denying a request for jurisdictional discovery
where plaintiff failed to meet its burden of making out a threshold prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction); Kalon v. Koresko Fin. LP, No. 14-5216, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64116, at *12 n.8
(E.D. Pa. 2020) (denying request for jurisdiction discovery); See Barth v. Walt Disney Parks &
Resorts U.S., Inc., 697 F. App’x 119, 120 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of request where
“jurisdictional discovery would have been futile”).
WGCZ is a foreign defendant and it should not be subject to the burden of conducting
unnecessary and costly discovery in the United States without some showing on the part of
Plaintiff that such discovery is warranted.

13
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C.

Plaintiff’s Proposed Amendment Is Futile

Plaintiff seeks to amend her Amended Complaint to “add a count for successor liability
and to add NKL as a party[.]” (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Mot. at 2.) As noted above, the Court
previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Facebook, Imgur, and Reddit based on immunity
under CDA § 230(c). A review of the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto reflects that NKL
would likewise be entitled to immunity for the claims asserted in this action based on its
ownership and operation of XNXX.com. (Seifert Decl. ¶ 10; see also Am. Compl. Ex. P.)
Plaintiff describes XNXX.com as an “interactive platform by which Pennsylvanians upload and
download millions of pornographic images and videos.” (Pl.’s Opp./Cross-Motion at 6.)
Interactive websites and social media platforms are entitled to immunity under § 230(c) for
content provided by third parties. Review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Exhibit P
reflects that Plaintiff’s photograph was posted on XNXX.com by an individual, or individuals,
under the screen name(s) “endzeitH – NylonLuver - DebbyLynn – Ginger Snap –
easytiger511111.” (Am. Compl. Ex. P.) Immunity under § 230(c) applies when a third-party
places content on an interactive website or social media platform. (See 6/5/20 Mem.) Because
NKL is entitled to immunity under CDA § 230(c), further amendment of Plaintiff’s pleadings
would be futile.

14
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V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, WGCZ’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted, Plaintiff’s claims

against WGCZ will be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint will be dismissed. 5 Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend her pleading to add NKL as a
defendant will be denied because the proposed amendment is futile.
An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

_/s/ John Milton Younge___________
Judge John Milton Younge

5

Having dismissed Plaintiff's claims against all named Defendants, Plaintiff's remaining claims
exist solely against Doe Defendants. See Mcginty v. Brennan, No. 15-6855, 2017 WL 1536417, at *3 n.6
(D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2017) (citing Baker v. United States, 642 Fed. App’x. 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Case law
is clear that an action cannot be maintained solely against Doe defendants.”); Breslin v. Philadelphia, 92
F.R.D. 764, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“Given the identification of the remaining defendants only as ‘John
Doe,’ there is no method of serving the complaint in accord with due process, and no way that the action
can otherwise proceed.”)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety.
Id.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREN HEPP,
Plaintiff
v.
FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 19-4034-JMY

ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd

day of August, 2020, upon consideration of Defendant WGCZ,

S.R.O.’s (“WGCZ”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 77), Plaintiff’s
Opposition to WGCZ’s Motion and Cross-Motion to Amend the Complaint to Add a Count for
Successor Liability and to Add a Party (ECF No. 83), and all documents submitted in support
thereof and in opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that:
1.

Defendant WGCZ’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 77) is GRANTED and WGCZ

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action.
2.

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Amend the Complaint to Add a Count for Successor

Liability and to Add a Party (ECF No. 83) is DENIED.
3.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 1

1

Having dismissed Plaintiff's claims against all named Defendants, Plaintiff's remaining claims
exist solely against Doe Defendants. See Mcginty v. Brennan, No. 15-6855, 2017 WL 1536417, at *3 n.6
(D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2017) (citing Baker v. United States, 642 Fed. App’x. 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Case law
is clear that an action cannot be maintained solely against Doe defendants.”); Breslin v. Philadelphia, 92
F.R.D. 764, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“Given the identification of the remaining defendants only as ‘John
Doe,’ there is no method of serving the complaint in accord with due process, and no way that the action
can otherwise proceed.”)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Id.
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4.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED TO CLOSE THIS CASE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge
Judge John Milton Younge
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